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Abstract
The concept of belief is analyzed and then discussed within the context of the current climate of
atheist distrust in America. To begin, Moore’s Paradox, and its relationship to an important
claim made by Wittgenstein regarding false beliefs, is explored. Next, the definition of belief that
results from affirming Wittgenstein’s claim is outlined and subsequently defended from an
attempted refutation constructed by John N. Williams. The defended definition of belief, which
regards direct doxastic voluntarism as false, is then used to argue that atheists do not directly
choose to not believe in any gods so as to evade moral responsibility.

Direct doxastic voluntarism is the notion that human beings have direct and voluntary control
over their beliefs, and it is commonly regarded as false (Booth 2007, 115-130). In this paper, I
will refute John N. Williams’s attempt to invalidate a claim made by Ludwig Wittgenstein that,
if successfully invalidated, would give credence to the doctrine of direct doxastic voluntarism.
Therefore, by defending Wittgenstein’s claim, which is based on Moore’s Paradox, I am
indirectly defending the stance that direct doxastic voluntarism is false. Next, in an effort to use
philosophical theory as a form of social activism, I will explore the implications of refuting
Williams by examining how the falsity of direct doxastic voluntarism affects people that identify
as atheists or non-believers. To be more specific, I will argue that while the unfavorable
reputation of atheists in America should be reconsidered for numerous reasons, one specific
reason that deserves more attention is that an atheist’s lack of direct control over her lack of
belief in God should eliminate the worry that atheists choose to not believe in God so as to
escape the moral codes commonly offered by religions. To begin on this complex journey of
theory and application, I will first describe Moore’s Paradox and how it is essential to this
discussion.
Background: Moore’s Paradox
Ludwig Wittgenstein was apparently impressed by G.E. Moore’s discovery of a type of
absurdity that arises from phrases such as the following: “It is raining but I don’t believe that it is
raining” (Malcolm 1984, 56). Wittgenstein went on to coin the term “Moore’s Paradox” for this
brand of absurdity in his book entitled Philosophical Investigations. After analyzing Moore’s
discovery, Wittgenstein concluded, “If there were a verb meaning ‘to believe falsely’, it would
not have any significant first person indicative” (Wittgenstein 1958, 190). Put in simpler terms,
Wittgenstein concluded that one cannot reasonably make the assertion, “I falsely believe that p.”
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While this one conclusion may seem trivial in comparison to the remainder of Philosophical
Investigations, it is an extremely powerful statement because it indirectly defines belief as a
system of information acknowledgment that is subject to instantaneous modification. In other
words, if someone acknowledges that her belief that p is incorrect, her belief that p immediately
changes to take into account the perceived error (it is a perceived error because the new belief
may not be objectively true). In an attempt to invalidate Wittgenstein’s conclusion, John N.
Williams (2006) provides a complex counter-example in his paper entitled “Wittgenstein,
Moorean Absurdity, and its Disappearance from Speech” that, despite its complexity, fails as a
refutation (225-254). Before delving into the argument presented by Williams and its
implications, it is necessary to elaborate further on the definition of belief that emerges from
Wittgenstein’s conclusion.
The Concept of Belief
Beliefs are typically acquired through observation, experience, experiments, or logic.
This accounts for both empirical beliefs, those based on sensory evidence, and a priori beliefs,
those based on reasoning alone. To focus in on empirically derived beliefs, consider two
hypothetical people’s beliefs about the solar system: Quinn believes that the sun orbits the earth
while Jane believes that the earth orbits the sun. Quinn has been convinced that the sun revolves
around the earth by (incorrectly) using a telescope he bought at a garage sale. Jane has been
convinced that the earth revolves around the sun by scientific evidence conducted by various
people over the last few centuries. While both Quinn and Jane arrived at their respective
conclusions via empirical evidence, it is important to note that Jane’s evidence was derived from
the scientific method and Quinn’s was not. It is technically possible for Quinn to be correct in his
belief (it is also technically possible that unicorns real) and Jane to be incorrect, but this is simply
not likely for obvious reasons. However, in terms of belief, it does not matter whether the sun
does the orbiting or not, because Quinn and Jane have both been convinced that what they
believe is true. Therefore, all that matters for belief is that the evidence was compelling.
Evidence for a belief can be extremely hollow, but as long as a believer is convinced,
then the belief will persist. In fact, more important to a belief than the validity of the evidence is
the conviction of a believer. Once convinced that p, a believer cannot directly choose to believe
that not-p, which means that direct doxastic voluntarism is false. For example, suppose that Bob
is asked, “Do you believe that Santa Claus is real?” If Bob were truly convinced by some
evidence that Santa Claus was real (say, a doctored photograph of Santa Claus flying through the
air that Bob thought was a legitimate photograph), then a truthful response would be “Yes, I
believe Santa Claus is real.” If Bob claimed that he did not believe, then he would be lying since
he was truly compelled by the evidence. On the other hand, the same evidence may not compel
another person, such as Joe. Joe is convinced, based on a lack of any scientific evidence that
Santa Claus is real, that Santa Claus is simply a fictitious character. Joe could truthfully respond
by saying “No, I do not believe that Santa Claus is real.” To say that he did believe would be a
lie. It would therefore be contradictory for a person to say, “I am convinced that Santa Claus is
real based on the evidence I have analyzed, yet I do not believe that Santa Claus is real.” This
reflects the standard definition of belief and goes against direct doxastic voluntarism.
Since belief is based on the acknowledgment of information through experience or
reason, then it follows that it is subject to instantaneous modification. As people acquire and
integrate new information into their belief systems, their previous beliefs can either remain intact
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or shift depending on how compelling they find the information. When a belief shifts due to
modification, it can be a small shift or a drastic one. An example of a drastic shift would be an
atheist instantly becoming a theist after seeing God appear in the sky. Drastic shifts like this one
seem to suggest that beliefs are black and white; either you are a theist or an atheist. However,
when smaller shifts occur, it is clear that there are degrees to belief. For example, a person that
believes that God exists might slightly shift her view after hearing a lecture on evolution. She
still believes that God exists, but not to the same degree as before. In examining Richard
Dawkins’s (2006) spectrum of theistic probability as outlined in The God Delusion, it is clear
that a dichotomous issue (God either does or doesn’t exist) does not mean that people’s beliefs
are dichotomous:
1 Strong

theist. 100% probability of God. In the words of C.G. Jung: “I do not
believe, I know.”
2 De facto theist. Very high probability but short of 100%. “I don't know for
certain, but I strongly believe in God and live my life on the assumption that he is
there.”
3 Leaning towards theism. Higher than 50% but not very high. “I am very
uncertain, but I am inclined to believe in God.”
4 Completely impartial. Exactly 50%. “God's existence and non-existence are
exactly equiprobable.”
5 Leaning towards atheism. Lower than 50% but not very low. “I do not know
whether God exists but I'm inclined to be skeptical.”
6 De facto atheist. Very low probability, but short of zero. “I don't know for certain
but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is
not there.”
7 Strong atheist. “I know there is no God, with the same conviction as Jung knows
there is one.” (Dawkins 2006, 50)
Based on this belief spectrum, it is perfectly feasible that one might shift her view to a degree of
complete doubt where she finds the existence of God to be exactly equiprobable with the
nonexistence of God (which is marked as a 4 on Dawkins’s scale). This shows that while belief
may appear black and white for dichotomous issues, it actually lies on a spectrum with certainty
that p placed opposite to certainty that not-p. In reality, God (by most standard definitions) either
does or does not exist (p or not-p), but our belief on the issue lies on a spectrum. For issues that
are less clearly dichotomous, such as whether or not someone is bald, the same spectrum of
belief applies. For example, I could hold a strong belief that someone is mostly bald while I
could not hold a strong belief that God mostly exists.
To further detail the instantaneous process of belief modification, suppose you are inside a
windowless house when it begins to rain. Convinced that it is not raining, you step outside to see
that it is in fact raining. The instant that you acknowledge your mistake about the rain, your
belief about the rain changes too. Before stepping outside you might say, “I believe that it is not
raining.” Upon stepping outside, you see that it is clearly raining. Although you see it is raining,
you could still maintain the belief that it is not raining if you have not truly acknowledged that it
is raining. This is important because it shows that the brain’s reception of sensory data is not the
sole cause of the modification of belief. Someone with perfect human vision could have her eyes
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directed at the rain, with the visible light hitting the retina, causing the brain to process the sense
data, and still she may not acknowledge the rain. For example, one might be spaced out or
distracted by some other thought that causes the visual data to go unacknowledged. However, the
precise instant in which one acknowledges that it is raining is also the precise instant in which
the belief changes. Clearly, the input of sense data (visible light in this example) is crucial for the
acknowledgement to occur, but the belief does not change without the acknowledgement of the
data. Therefore, the acknowledgment of new evidence is directly linked to a person’s belief
about a particular subject.
The fact that sense data alone does not form beliefs is evidenced by a phenomenon called
change blindness, defined as the “difficulty in detecting, visible—sometimes quite
conspicuous—differences when the differences are viewed successively” (Dretske 2004, 1). Fred
Dretske (2004) provides the following example of change blindness: “I’m looking for a friend in
a crowd. I can’t find him. He sees me and waves. I then see him. As it turns out, I was, several
times, looking straight at him, but before he attracted my attention by waving, I didn’t see him”
(1). In this example, sense data is entering the brain of the looker through the eyes, and yet for
some period of time the looker has not acknowledged that she is receiving this sense data. Until
she acknowledges her friend she does not yet believe that she is looking at him. Once she
realizes that he is there then her belief instantly changes. While it is up for debate as to whether
the looker was consciously aware of her friend before acknowledging him or whether she knew
that the friend was there before she acknowledged him, one thing is certain: sensory data
precedes acknowledgment.
Wittgenstein and Williams
To summarize thus far, beliefs are acceptances of perceived truths that can change
instantaneously. In support of this view of belief, Wittgenstein offers his conclusion that a verb
meaning “to falsely believe” would have no meaning in the first person present indicative. For
example, “I falsely believe that today is Tuesday” is absurd whereas “Bob falsely believes that it
is Tuesday” is not. Ultimately, Wittgenstein’s conclusion is that one can never admit to a
mistaken belief in the present tense indicative because the instant that a belief is deemed
mistaken in the mind the belief is modified. When this modification occurs, the belief is no
longer mistaken; it is a new belief. This includes instances when a belief turns into a lack of
belief in something. For example, a theist who has never read the Bible may claim, “I believe
that God exists.” After reading the Bible she may change her belief from a positive belief in God
to an absence of belief in God. Now she might claim, “I find God’s existence and non-existence
to be equiprobable,” which is a rare but viable stance to take. If the person finds additional
compelling evidence that God doesn’t exist she might even go as far as saying, “I do not believe
that God exists.” This is the stance of an atheist. In this example, the person started with a
positive view of God’s existence and then transitioned to an undecided view of God’s existence,
and finally ended up with a negative view of God’s existence. At no point in this evolution of a
belief could the person claim, “I mistakenly believe...” without speaking in a contradictory
manner.
Having established the standard view of belief, we can now examine Williams’s attempt
to refute Wittgenstein’s claim about a hypothetical verb meaning “to falsely believe.” The
scenario that Williams provides as a refutation involves Superman approaching him and
informing him of three true things: First, that Williams is acquainted with Superman when he is
LUX: A Journal of Transdisciplinary Writing and Research from Claremont Graduate University, Volume 2
© Claremont University Consortium, December 2012 | http://scholarship.claremont.edu/lux/

http://scholarship.claremont.edu/lux/vol2/iss1/30
DOI: 10.5642/lux.201301.30

4

Thompson: Moore’s Paradox, Direct Doxastic Voluntarism, and Atheist Distrust
Thompson 5

wearing his disguise; second, that Williams works with the disguised version of Superman at the
Daily Planet; third, that Williams thinks that the disguised version of Superman is an idiot. Since
Williams is acquainted with multiple coworkers whom he regards as idiotic, he is not aware of
which coworker is in fact Superman. He also realizes that since Superman has superior
intelligence, he has been falsely regarding one of his coworkers as being an idiot. Assuming that
Williams takes Superman’s information to be completely accurate, Williams feels obligated to
express his mistaken belief about his unknown coworker. After tailoring his assertion in an
attempt to avoid any contradiction or absurdity, Williams (2006) tells Superman: “I mistakenly
believe you are an idiot whenever I meet you disguised as that colleague at the Daily Planet”
(249). While at first glance it appears that Williams has successfully used the first person
indicative of “to believe falsely (or mistakenly),” a closer inspection reveals a problem with his
logic. Even a complex example involving alter egos and disguises cannot make possible any
assertion that begins with “I mistakenly believe…” without the speaker lying or being selfdefeating.
For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that there are only two people (say, Clark and
Carl) at the Daily Planet that Williams believes are idiotic before Superman revealed the
information about his alter ego. Next, it must be made clear that Williams is truly convinced by
what Superman has told him, meaning he absolutely believes that one of the two (perceived)
idiots at work is actually Superman in disguise. After hearing Superman’s information, Williams
feels the need to express to Superman that he mistook either Clark or Carl for being a fool. In the
response that Williams gives he begins the sentence with “I mistakenly believe.” This would be
incorrect since Williams has accepted new information about the situation and therefore no
longer falsely believes them both to be fools. In fact, Williams whole-heartedly believes (since
he absolutely trusts Superman) that one of them is merely acting the part. To be correct,
Williams could say, “I mistakenly believed you were an idiot whenever I met you disguised as
that colleague at the Daily Planet.” If Williams feels compelled to speak in the present tense
without contradicting himself he could say, “I believe that either Carl or Clark is merely acting
like an idiot” or “I believe that you are merely acting like an idiot disguised as either Clark or
Carl.” Williams has failed to notice that his assertion is inaccurate since it does not take into
account the newly obtained information.
By proposing a counter-example to Wittgenstein’s claim, Williams is indirectly arguing
against the standard view of belief and for the truth of direct doxastic voluntarism. If Williams
had been successful with his Superman scenario, he might have effectively altered the linguistic
utilization of belief. If one could assert, “I mistakenly believe…” without any logical problems,
then the current view of belief would be further complicated. If Williams felt that his example
was cohesive and sound, he should have explored possible ramifications on the traditional view
of belief. Instead, Williams quickly dismisses Wittgenstein’s claim (after crafting his first reply
to Superman, “I mistakenly believe that you are an idiot”) without truly acknowledging the
impact of his dismissal: “Moreover, in apparent contradiction of Wittgenstein, I seem to have
used the first-person present indicative to make a non-self-defeating assertion” (Williams 2006,
248). Until a valid counter-example can be constructed, Wittgenstein appears to be correct in his
claim about first-person present tense assertions of false belief.
Belief, Language, and Time
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In addition to providing an explanation for the absurdity found in Moore’s Paradox, one
of the main goals of Williams’s (2006) article is to understand situations in which the absurdity
disappears (225-254). While Williams is successful in his explanation of Moore’s Paradox, he
fails to give a full account of why the absurdity disappears in certain contexts. More specifically,
his account is missing an explanation of why the absurdity disappears when referring to the past
or future. At its core, the absurdity of Moore’s Paradox arises out of the linear nature in which
our language refers to time. Whether time is in fact linear, our language most certainly regards it
as so. The past, present, and future tenses of words can be viewed as a timeline in which events
have occurred. As Williams briefly mentions, the absurdity of Moore’s Paradox vanishes when
the assertions are made in the past or future tense. However, instead of providing an explanation
of why the absurdity disappears, he simply provides an example for both the past and future
tenses. This lack of explanation leaves his account of Moore’s Paradox deficient. By examining
the past tense and then future tense versions of Moore’s Paradox, it is clear that the underlying
reason for the disappearance of the absurdity is the same.
For the past tense, Williams (2006) gives the example, “Yesterday I failed to correctly
believe that it was raining” (238). As Williams correctly notes, this assertion is not absurd. The
reason for the lack of absurdity is that the past tense is quite different from the present tense in
that it refers to a larger set of moments. When speaking in the first-person past tense, one can
refer to any moment from the beginning of her existence up until the present moment, whereas
the first-person present tense refers to only one moment: the present moment. (Of course, since
we are referring to the first-person uses of belief in the past tense then the timeline begins at the
first moment in which the person making the assertion held a belief. In his example, Williams
narrows down the number of moments by referring to yesterday, but his example could have
easily been less restrictive such as, “I failed to correctly believe it was raining.”) Because the
past tense refers to multiple moments, the hearer of Williams’s phrase can assume that what is
actually being said is, “Yesterday, while it was raining, I believed that it was not raining.
However, between that moment and now I have been convinced that it was in fact raining when I
thought it was not. Therefore, yesterday, I failed to correctly believe that it was raining.”
Speaking in the past tense does not necessitate that all the events in an assertion occurred
simultaneously. If the realization (and thus the formation of the belief) that it was in fact raining
occurred simultaneously with the assertion of belief that it was not raining, then the same
problem that arises from present tense assertions would occur. In other words, the assertion is not
the equivalent of saying, “Yesterday, while it was raining, I believed that it was not raining.
After acknowledging that it was raining, I still held my false belief that it was not raining.” Thus,
one cannot assert simultaneous acknowledgement that p and disbelief that p in the present or the
past tense. Nor can a person assert such a thing in the future tense.
Like the past tense, the future tense also deals with a large number of moments. For this
same reason, the future tense of Moore’s Paradox does not produce any absurdity. Williams
(2006) gives the example, “Tomorrow I will mistakenly believe that Big Brother is not a fiction”
(238). This example is not absurd since Williams may be accurately predicting the outcome of a
scheduled brainwashing. The disappearance of the absurdity is due to the fact that the mistaken
belief that Big Brother is not a fiction does not coincide on the timeline with the current
acknowledgement that Big Brother is a fiction. In other words, Williams will never acknowledge
that Big Brother is a fiction while simultaneously believing that it is not a fiction. To keep things
simple, let’s use the rain example to understand what it is at play. One might say, “Tomorrow I
will mistakenly believe that it is not raining” without any absurdity. In reality, what is being said
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is, “I currently believe that it will rain tomorrow. However, while it is raining, I will be
convinced that it is not raining.” Just as with the past tense, the future tense of Moore’s Paradox
eliminates the absurdity because the acknowledgement of p and disbelief that p do not occur
simultaneously.
Direct Doxastic Voluntarism
Now that we have established that beliefs are instantaneously modified to take into
account any new, contradictory, and compelling information, it is important to discuss how this
affects the degree of choice one has in believing or not believing that p. To begin, let us clearly
define these terms “new,” “contradictory,” and “compelling” as they relate to belief so as to
avoid any confusion. Technically speaking, every moment of human existence is new, even if it
contains familiar stimuli or if it echoes past events. Therefore, everything (every thought or
every piece of sense data) is novel and thus can potentially shift a person’s beliefs. For example,
I may take a shower every single day without it affecting my belief in God until one day the first
sensation of hot water on my arm triggers a seemingly random thought in my brain that causes
me to lose my faith completely. Now, although technically new, familiar stimuli and experiences
typically have less power in changing beliefs than new stimuli and experiences. In addition,
relevant stimuli and experiences have a greater chance of shifting my beliefs than irrelevant
ones. In the shower example, it was a familiar and irrelevant stimulus that changed my mind
about God, which is rare. Therefore, beliefs are typically changed in the presence of unfamiliar
and relevant stimuli and experiences, which explains the power of persuasion that documentary
films have. For example, my opinion on Japanese whaling is more likely to change while I am
watching my first documentary on Japanese whaling (unfamiliar and relevant stimuli) than if I
am taking a shower (familiar and irrelevant stimuli).
Next, we must define what is meant by contradictory evidence when referring to beliefs.
Contradictory evidence refers to any evidence that depicts the truth about something as different
from one’s current belief about that something. In other words, contradictory evidence does not
imply that the evidence being processed is the complete opposite of a person’s current belief. For
example, if I believe Santa Claus is real and that flying reindeer carry his sleigh, I might come
across some contradictory evidence that demonstrates that while Santa Claus is real, he is
actually carried by flying Bolivian marsh deer. This new information contradicts my previous
belief about Santa Claus, but it only contradicts one aspect of my belief. This is important to note
because it emphasizes the fact that beliefs can evolve gradually and subtly. Losing one’s belief in
God is more commonly a subtle and gradual process as opposed to a violent removal of a rug
from beneath one’s feet. This is evidenced by Jesse M. Smith’s (2011) study on the process of
becoming an atheist where he analyzes a series of in-depth interviews he conducted with selfavowed atheists. He argues that atheists undergo a gradual process of forming their atheistic
identity, which involves a period of questioning theistic and religious beliefs. A number of
participants in the study specifically described the slow progression and thoughtful consideration
that lead them to reject theism (Smith 2011, 215-237).
Finally, the term “compelling” (which can be used interchangeably with the word and
concept of “convincing”) must be defined in a tautological fashion: evidence is compelling if it
results in the change of a person’s belief(s). In other words, when referring to belief, the degree
to which something is compelling is identical to the degree to which a person’s belief shifts. Or,
to put it negatively, if something does not shift a person’s belief(s), then it was not compelling to
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her. For example, if Melissa truly finds The God Delusion to be extremely compelling evidence
that there is no God, then her belief in God would have to have shifted to a large degree, say
from a 2 to a 5 on Dawkins’s spectrum of theistic probability. If she only found the book to be
mildly compelling then her belief in God might have only shifted from 2 to a 3. If I truly have a
strong belief in God then it simply means that my life experiences (that is, the totality of all that I
have experienced, thought, sensed, dreamt, felt, etc.) have compelled me to have a strong belief
in God. Of course, what two different people find compelling may be wildly different, which
means that the degree to which one finds evidence to be compelling is subjective. This explains
why a theist might find the beautiful arrangement of colors displayed during a sunset to be
compelling evidence that God exists while an atheist might find the same event to be compelling
evidence that there is no God.
This analysis supports a view of belief that opposes direct doxastic voluntarism since
being compelled by new and contradictory evidence is not a choice; it occurs instantaneously
with acknowledgment of information. As the analysis of Wittgenstein’s claim revealed in the
previous section, the reason why acknowledging a mistaken belief in the present moment is selfdefeating is because beliefs update instantaneously with information acknowledgment. In fact,
the distinction between acknowledgement of information and the modification of belief is
illusory since they describe the same single event. Therefore, for direct doxastic voluntarism to
be true, it would mean that either acknowledgment of information is a choice or that
acknowledged information could be willfully negated. For the first horn, acknowledgment of
information could not be a choice because to have a choice in acknowledgment would mean that
one has acknowledged the information in the first place. In other words, to choose to be unaware
that p first requires one to be aware that p, which would mean that one is already aware that p.
As for the second horn, our definition of belief requires that this is impossible. If we can negate a
belief at will then we did not truly believe it because we were clearly not compelled by the
evidence. In other words, something that can be un-believed at will was not a belief in the first
place.
Doxastic Voluntarism and Atheist Mistrust
Atheism, for many people, has a strong negative connotation. Therefore, it should come as
no surprise that empirical evidence demonstrates that atheists are some of the most distrusted
people in both private and public settings in the United States (Edgell, Hartmann, and Gerteis
2006, 211-234). While there are certainly multiple reasons for such distrust, one common reason
is that people fear that a lack of belief in any gods equates to a lack of morality. Instead of
arguing that atheists can be as good as anyone else in terms of morality, I want to focus on why
people come to the conclusion that atheists are less moral than other members of a society.
Research supports the hypothesis that the relationship between atheist distrust and the belief in
God is fully mediated by the view that people will behave better if they believe that God is
watching over them (Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan 2011, 1189-1206). In other words, people
fear that if someone doesn’t believe in God then she may misbehave because she can get away
with it. Again, instead of arguing that this is not the case, I want to argue that an atheist’s lack of
control over her beliefs should eliminate any worry that atheists choose to be atheists so as to be
able to misbehave under the belief that no God is watching over them. In other words, the falsity
of direct doxastic voluntarism means that atheism is a view that is not arrived upon by a simple
choice to evade moral responsibility.
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To argue this position, I first want to point out that being part of one of the most
distrusted groups of people in the United States is not desirable. While many ex-theists certainly
feel happier once they become atheists, this does not mean that being an atheist, especially an
outspoken one, is not often challenging. Why then do people become atheists if being an atheist
means carrying such a negative stereotype? While there are numerous reasons for becoming an
atheist, a recent study by Hunsberger and Altemeyer (2006) found that in spite of the benefits
that religious affiliation can offer as well as the fact that belief in God is the norm in America,
atheists are often people that “could not make themselves believe” (42). In addition, these
researchers also found that the skepticism towards religion and God that atheists foster is mainly
a result of concerns about empirical evidence and logical consistency. That is, atheists were not
found to deny God so as to free themselves of any moral restrictions that religion or theism
might impose (Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006, 39). That being said, some people still regard a
person’s switch to atheism as a simple choice that was made out of the selfish desire to not be
held responsible by God for certain actions (as an undergraduate I attended a university approved
lecture where the speaker claimed that atheists choose to reject God so as to become “moral
degenerates”). As our analysis of belief has demonstrated, people do not have direct control over
their beliefs. Therefore, a theist cannot simply wake up one morning and decide to be an atheist
because she wants to misbehave. Without any new, contradictory, and compelling evidence, one
cannot simply change her belief in God at will. Of course, it is theoretically possible that the very
decision to change her belief functioned as new, contradictory, and compelling evidence to
change her belief, but this is extremely unlikely. The fact that many atheists want to believe in
God but simply cannot convince themselves that God exists demonstrates the inability for one to
directly choose her beliefs.
One might object and claim that while direct doxastic voluntarism is false, indirect
doxastic voluntarism is true. Indirect doxastic voluntarism is the notion that people have indirect
control over some of their beliefs, and it is largely accepted to be true (Vitz 2011, “Doxastic
Voluntarism”). By choosing to research certain topics and to evaluate certain evidence, people
gain indirect control of their beliefs. For example, Lily could indirectly choose to be an atheist by
reading books by prominent atheists. Coupled with her desire to lose her belief in God, she might
be able to successfully convince herself that there is no God. Of course, this would still require
her to find the evidence compelling, otherwise her efforts would be in vain. Considering that
many atheists try to become theists by seeking out experiences and evidence that would affirm
the existence of God and still fail to change their beliefs, it stands to reason that some beliefs are
less subject to indirect control than others.
What we can draw from this is that while indirect doxastic voluntarism allows for some
people to indirectly choose to change their belief on the existence of God, it is certainly not an
instantaneous change. It requires research, thoughtful consideration, and seeking out life
experiences that might shift one’s perspective. And still, with all of this effort, there is no
guarantee of successful belief modification. In fact, it is entirely possible that a person’s search
for compelling and contradictory evidence causes her to strengthen her original belief. Unlike the
indirect voluntary control one has in learning violin, where the more hours spent practicing
generally correlates positively with skill level, trying to indirectly change one’s beliefs can often
backfire. I can speak from personal experience that my becoming an atheist resulted from an
attempt to reaffirm my shaky belief in God. I wanted to believe, so I spent countless hours trying
to convince myself to no avail. In the end, it was only through thoughtful consideration and
research that I declared myself to be an atheist. Therefore, because the nature of belief leaves
LUX: A Journal of Transdisciplinary Writing and Research from Claremont Graduate University, Volume 2
© Claremont University Consortium, December 2012 | http://scholarship.claremont.edu/lux/

9

LUX: A Journal of Transdisciplinary Writing and Research from Claremont Graduate University, Vol. 2 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 30
Thompson 10

humans with only the potential for indirect control over their belief in God, those who distrust
atheists out of fear that they choose not to believe in God so as to misbehave have little to no
reason to do so.
Conclusion
Moore’s Paradox is vastly interesting because the absurdity that it reveals also uncovers a
great deal about the concept of belief. In addition, Wittgenstein’s claim based on Moore’s
Paradox indirectly reveals some essential features about the nature of belief. Belief is a system of
information acknowledgment that is instantaneously modified with new, contradictory, and
compelling evidence, which explains why humans cannot easily change their beliefs even if they
want to. By defending Wittgenstein’s claim from Williams’s attempted invalidation, we have
indirectly argued against the doctrine of direct doxastic voluntarism. Since people cannot directly
and voluntarily control their beliefs, then the distrust of atheists that results from the worry that
atheists choose a Godless life so as to be able to misbehave is unwarranted. While the validity of
the doctrine of indirect doxastic voluntarism demonstrates that we have indirect control over
some of our beliefs, it does not guarantee that any amount of effort can change certain beliefs.
Therefore, atheists should not be feared or distrusted since their atheism did not arise out of a
simple choice to evade moral responsibility. My hope is that a better understanding of atheism
and what it entails will eventually eliminate the unwarranted prejudice that exists in our current
social climate.
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